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Reported by Multiple Segment Firms  
 
SFAS No. 131 was enacted to improve disclosure about the diversity of a firm’s 
operations.1 Other studies investigating whether this objective was achieved compare the 
number of segments reported by firms before and after SFAS No. 131, and interpret an increase 
in number of reported segments as evidence of improved segment disclosure (e.g., Berger and 
Hann 2003a; Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Street et al. 2000).  This approach is appropriate for 
firms that were managed as multiple segment firms before SFAS No. 131 but were not 
reported as such until after SFAS No. 131 (i.e., single to multiple segment reporters, S-M 
firms).  It is not as well suited for firms that were managed and reported as multiple segment 
firms before as well as after SFAS No. 131 (i.e. continuous multiple segment reporters, M-M 
firms).  For these firms, the effect of the change from an industry-based to management-based 
approach to defining reporting segments, required by SFAS No. 131, was to increase, decrease, 
or not change the number of segments reported.2  
If one uses segment numbers as a measure of information about operating diversity, as 
in prior studies, SFAS No. 131 must be viewed as not improving segment disclosure for firms 
experiencing no changes in the number of reported segments. Similarly, SFAS No. 131 would 
appear to have decreased information about operating diversity for firms that decreased the  
number of reported segments. This is a troubling interpretation given the (subsequently 
documented) size and economic importance of M-M firms.  We employ a different metric to 
assess the effect of SFAS No. 131 on disclosures of information, about the diversity of 
operating income across segments, by continuous multiple segment reporters. Our metric, the 
range of reported segment profits, captures the cross-segment variability of reported profits, 
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which we argue represents diversity in operating results.3  Our use of the cross-segment 
variability metric is motivated by the aggregation criteria of SFAS No. 131 (paragraph 17), 
which are intended to dissuade multiple segment firms from aggregating operating segments 
with different economic characteristics as indicated by different profit margins.4 Our measure 
captures improvements in disclosure of operating diversity because, if firms applied the 
aggregation criteria as intended, the cross-segment variability of reported segment profits 
should have increased after SFAS No. 131.  This scenario assumes managers did not use the 
flexibility inherent in the SFAS No. 131 management approach to transfer revenues and costs 
among segments, so as to conceal differences in segment profitability.5 
 Our analysis begins by documenting differences between M-M and S-M firms.  It 
shows that M-M firms are more diverse, profitable and complex but less dependent on external 
financing than S-M firms.  The M-M firms are an economically important group of firms for 
which the effect of SFAS No. 131 has not previously been assessed.  Comparison of the 
number of pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 segments reported by S-M and M-M firms shows an 
average increase from one to three segments for S-M firms, but that the predominant effect on 
M-M firms was no change in number of segments or a decrease.  Use of our alternative metric 
for assessing the effect of SFAS No. 131 – the cross-segment variability of reported profits – 
suggests that SFAS No. 131 increased information about operating diversity, an effect that 
could not have been documented for M-M firms using the number of reported segments metric.   
We further assess the effect of SFAS No. 131 on M-M firms by testing four hypotheses: 
H1: Firms revealed more about differences in segment profitability after SFAS No. 131. H2: 
SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profit disclosures.  H3: SFAS No. 131 
reduced the effect of proprietary cost incentives on segment disclosures. H4: Firms that depend 
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more on external financing disclose more about differences in segment profitability after SFAS 
No. 131. 
We test H1 by estimating the change in the cross-segment variability of reported profits 
from the pre- to post-SFAS No. 131 periods.  Univariate statistics show that a significant 
increase occurred, a result consistent with firms disclosing more about differences in segment 
profitability after SFAS No. 131.  The positive coefficient of a SFAS No. 131 indicator variable 
in a pooled regression of pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 observations, which controls for other 
influences on the variability of reported segment profits, also is consistent with this 
interpretation. 
To determine whether the increase in cross-segment profit variability is attributable to 
the adoption of SFAS No. 131 and to provide a basis for testing our remaining hypotheses, we 
develop and test models that include variables proxying for other factors that could affect the 
cross-segment variability of reported profits: the cross-segment variability that would exist 
absent incentives to conceal differences (inherent variability), proprietary costs, and market 
incentives to reveal value-relevant segment differences.  The inclusion of proprietary cost 
variables is prompted by previous research (e.g., Harris 1998; Berger and Hann 2003b), which 
shows that firms with higher proprietary costs report fewer segments. It also is motivated by the 
often-stated claim that companies that disclose additional segment information suffer 
competitive harm (Taub 2004).  The inclusion of variables for market incentives is motivated 
by insights from Chen and Zhang (2003) and analysis of the incentives firms needing external 
financing have to disclose value relevant information (Frankel et al. 1995).   
H2 is based on the premise that a reported profit measure is more transparent if it is 
more strongly, and positively, associated with a measure of the inherent (‘true’) cross-segment 
variability of profits.  Our primary proxy for the latter is the cross-segment profit variability of 
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single segment firms in the four-digit SIC code industries corresponding to sample firms’ 
segments.  Comparison of the coefficients of separate regressions based on pre- and post-SFAS 
No. 131, and controlling for other factors affecting cross-segment variability, indicates a 
significant increase in the positive association between reported and inherent cross-segment 
variability.  We interpret this as evidence SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment 
disclosures. 
Comparison of the coefficient of proprietary cost variables in pre- and post-SFAS  No. 
131 regressions shows that the negative association between cross-segment variability and 
proprietary cost variables continues to be significant and essentially unchanged in magnitude 
after SFAS No. 131.  This is consistent with managers continuing to have some latitude to 
conceal differences in segment profitability that could be competitively harmful if disclosed.  It 
is not consistent with H3. 
Comparison of the coefficients of a variable reflecting a firm’s need for external 
financing shows that the positive association between need for external financing and cross-
segment profit variable is more positive after SFAS No. 131.   This is consistent with firms that 
depend more on external financing disclosing more about differences in operating profitability 
after SFAS No. 131, and also with H4. 
Our results are robust to experimentation with interacting variables representing 
competing incentives to conceal (reveal) differences in segment profitability, with elimination 
of high net loss segments, with adjustments to the dependent variable (cross-segment profit 
variability) to control for the effects of differences in segment size, and to use of different 
operationalizations of explanatory variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into five additional sections.  Section 1 
provides background.  Section 2 develops hypotheses, explains variable measurement, and 
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presents our model of reported cross-segment profit variability.  Section 3 describes the sample 
and documents differences between firms that did and did not report multiple segments prior to 
SFAS No. 131. Section 4 reports the results of primary tests and sensitivity analyses.  Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
1. Background 
This section contains two subsections.  The first explains the intended effects of SFAS 
No. 131 on the usefulness and transparency of segment disclosures and the concerns of 
managers about the proprietary costs of segment disclosures.  The second discusses the 
academic literature examining management’s proprietary cost incentives for concealing 
segment information, the effects of SFAS No. 131 on the number of reported segments, and 
capital market incentives to reveal segment differences.  This literature motivates our inclusion 
of proprietary cost and capital market variables in our empirical analysis of the effects of SFAS 
No. 131. In this section we also explain our incremental contribution to the literature. 
1.1 Institutional background 
In January 1996, the FASB and the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (FASB 
1996) jointly issued an exposure draft (ED) on segment reporting calling for firms to disclose 
information on the basis used internally to evaluate performance and to allocate resources to 
business units (i.e., the management approach to identifying segments).  The FASB received 
220 letters of comment on the ED.  Responding financial statement users favored the 
management approach, asserting that it would provide insights into the risks and opportunities 
facing each part of the business, better align segment footnote disclosures with management’s 
discussion and analysis, and reduce the incremental cost of segment reporting. 
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In contrast to users, the majority of commenting managers opposed the management 
approach, arguing that it would result in disclosure of information that would be competitively 
harmful.  They contended that public companies would be required to disclose more detailed 
product information than private companies or foreign competitors, and that powerful 
competitors would take advantage of more detailed segment information.6  Matrix Service 
Company, for example, contended: “The disclosure of our gross margins at this level of detail 
would virtually disclose our entire pricing structure to our competition” (ED response letter to 
FASB dated June 14, 1996). 
The Board responded to concerns about potential competitive harm by modifying 
aggregation criteria, adding quantitative materiality thresholds, and changing certain disclosure 
requirements.  SFAS No. 131, which was issued in June 1997, includes these changes 
(paragraph 111).  It is intended “to help users of financial statements: (a) better understand the 
enterprise’s performance, (b) better assess its prospects for future net cash flows, and (c) make 
more informed judgments about the enterprise as a whole” (SFAS No. 131, paragraph 3).  
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Proprietary cost incentives to conceal 
Harris (1998) uses a pre-SFAS No. 131 sample of multiple segment firms to estimate 
the relation between management’s decision to report operations in a given industry as a 
segment and two measures of proprietary costs: a four-firm concentration ratio and a measure 
of the speed of profit adjustment.7    Her results show that operations in less competitive (high 
proprietary cost) industries are less likely to be reported as industry segments.  Evidence 
consistent with SFAS No. 131 requiring disclosure of proprietary information is provided by 
Ettredge et al. (2002), which shows that firms most likely to suffer competitive harm from more 
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disaggregated segment disclosure experienced significant, negative abnormal returns on dates 
of FASB news releases prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 131.   
Berger and Hann (BH, 2003b) investigate whether firms that increased the numbers of 
their segments when adopting SFAS No. 131 had higher proprietary costs. They also 
investigate whether the decrease in market value (relative to sales) for firms reporting more 
segments after SFAS No. 131 is attributable to the release of proprietary information to 
competitors or to revealing agency problems. The firms in their sample disclose multiple 
segments after the adoption of SFAS No. 131 but not necessarily before.  Their model includes 
three measures of proprietary costs: firm-level industry-adjusted abnormal profits, rate of 
deterioration in abnormal profits8, and range of segment profit margins. They find a significant 
positive relation between pre-SFAS No. 131 aggregation and each of their profitability 
measures.  They interpret their findings as evidence pre-SFAS No. 131 aggregation was greater 
among firms for which the proprietary costs of additional disaggregation were higher, i.e., ones 
for which disaggregation would have revealed more detailed information about profit 
opportunities.   
Although BH (2003b) present evidence consistent with SFAS No. 131 causing some 
firms to disclose proprietary data, they find only weak evidence that the increase in the number 
of reported segments after SFAS No. 131 resulted in competitive harm, when measured as a 
decrease in abnormal profits.   One explanation for the absence of observed competitive harm is 
that the time period of BH’s study was too short for competitors to take advantage of the SFAS 
No. 131 disclosures by entering new or related lines of business.  Another is that firms might 
have increased the number of reported segments without revealing significantly more about 
differences in segment profitability, an outcome that would occur if the disclosed profit margin 
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of the newly disclosed segments differed little from the profit margins of previously disclosed 
segments.  
1.2.2 Capital market incentives to reveal 
 Managers have incentives to reveal as well as to conceal information (Fields et al. 2001, 
292).   The expectation that more informative disclosures increase liquidity and reduce the cost 
of capital (Verrechia 2001) provides incentives for firms that rely heavily on capital markets for 
financing to credibly disclose value-relevant information (Frankel et al. 1995).  
Chen and Zhang’s (2003) analysis, of capital market incentives for two-segment firms 
to disclose segment differences, demonstrates the value-relevance of segment disclosures.  
Chen and Zhang (2003) shows that the market value of a two-segment firm can be determined 
using corporate-level data when a firm’s operating segments are equally profitable and have 
equal growth opportunities.  When the operating segments have divergent profitability, 
however, valuation requires not only firm-level accounting data to convey information about 
overall firm operations, but also segment-level data to convey differences between the 
segments (p. 398).  In such a setting, providing more information about segment differences 
could increase firm value.9    
1.2.3. Contribution to the literature 
Our study differs from earlier and contemporaneous studies investigating the effect of 
SFAS No. 131 on segment disclosures in two important ways. First, our findings show that our 
measure of information about differences in segment performance (cross-segment variability of 
reported profits)  provides inferences about the effects of SFAS No. 131 that are not provided 
by other studies’ measures that are based on the change in number of disclosed segments 
between the pre-and post-SFAS No. 131 periods. Second, we concentrate on firms that 
disclosed multiple segments both before and after adopting SFAS No. 131. Previous studies of 
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SFAS No. 131 (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003a; Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Street et al. 2000) 
used samples composed mostly of relatively small companies that appear to have been 
managed as multiple segment firms in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period but disclosed only a single 
segment in their financial statements (i.e., single-to-multiple segment firms or S-M firms). It 
seems indisputable that SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of operating information 
disclosed by these S-M firms due to the greater disaggregation of their operating information. 
What is not clear is the effect SFAS No. 131 had on the segment information disclosed by 
larger, pre-SFAS No. 131 multi-segment disclosing companies (i.e., ‘multiple-to-multiple’ 
segment or M-M firms) that made up a relatively small portion of the prior studies’ samples. 
Descriptive evidence provided later in the paper documents the economic importance of M-M 
firms and how these firms differ from S-M firms.  
The effect of our focus on M-M firms deserves additional discussion. One sample 
selection criterion used in some prior studies is that the companies be multiple-segment 
disclosers in the post SFAS No. 131 period. This criterion results in the inclusion of large 
numbers of S-M firms in samples. For such firms, SFAS No. 131’s effect is always an increase 
in the number of segments (from one to two or more). Thus, including large numbers of S-M 
companies in samples generates results suggesting that SFAS No. 131 generally increased 
numbers of segments disclosed. However, as we show below, for M-M firms SFAS No. 131 
resulted in increases, decreases, or no changes in numbers of segments disclosed. This suggests 
that M-M firms should be studied separately, and that a different measure of improved 
information about operating diversity is required for these firms.    
2. Hypotheses and Empirical Model Development 
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2.1 Hypotheses 
SFAS No. 131 prohibits aggregation of segments with different economic 
characteristics, such as profit margins, because they are likely to have different long-term 
financial performance.   If preparers who previously aggregated segments with dissimilar profit 
margins interpreted SFAS No. 131 as prohibiting them from continuing to do so, 
implementation of SFAS No. 131 would have increased the cross-segment variability of 
reported profits.10  This line of reasoning provides the basis for our first hypothesis, which is 
stated in alternative form.   
H1: SFAS No. 131 increased the cross-segment variability of reported profits. 
The cross-segment variability of reported profits provides potentially useful information 
about differences in segment profitability.  A transparent measure of such differences would 
reflect the ‘true’ or inherent differences in segment profitability (i.e., the differences that would 
exist because of differences in economic characteristics.)  Conversely, a transparent measure 
would not have been manipulated to conceal inherent differences in segment profitability.  This 
line of reasoning provides the basis for our second hypothesis, which is stated in alternative 
form. 
H2:  The positive association between the cross-segment variability of reported profits 
and variables proxying for inherent variability increased (became more positive) after SFAS 
No. 131. 
SFAS No. 131 changed the methodology for identifying reportable segments but did not 
eliminate management’s incentives to conceal differences in segment profitability.  If the 
change in methodology made it more difficult for managers to conceal differences in reported 
segment profits that could cause competitive harm, the explanatory ability of variables 
representing managers’ incentives to conceal (i.e. proprietary costs) would have decreased after 
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SFAS No. 131.  Following this line of reasoning, we test the following hypothesis, which is 
stated in alternative form. 
H3: The negative association between the cross-segment variability of reported profits 
and variables proxying for proprietary cost decreased (became less negative) after SFAS No. 
131. 
Competition for low cost external financing provides incentives for firms to disclose 
value-relevant information.  If, as Chen and Zhang’s (2003) analysis suggests, information 
about differences in segment profitability is value-relevant and the methodology of SFAS No. 
131 improves disclosure about difference in segment profitability, the explanatory ability of  
variables reflecting firms’ reliance on external financing should increase after SFAS No. 131.  
Following this line of reasoning, we test the following hypothesis, which is stated in alternative 
form. 
H4: The positive association between the cross-segment variability of reported profits 
and variables proxying for reliance on external financing increased (became more positive) 
after SFAS No. 131.    
2.2 Empirical Model Variables 
Our empirical model includes variables representing the constructs of our conceptual model 
and four control variables. This section explains the choice and operationalization of the 
model’s variables. 
2.2.1. Cross-segment variability of reported profits 
We use the range of reported segment profits (ReptdProfVar) because it provides a valid 
measure of variance for as few as two to nine observations (Gitlow et al. 1989).11 The segment 
profit measure, return on sales (ROS), is computed using reported segment income from 
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operations in the numerator, the measure of segment profit reported by the largest number of 
sample firms.12 
2.2.2. Inherent cross-segment profit variability 
Inherent cross-segment profit variability is determined by the underlying business 
reporting unit activities in which a firm engages. For example, large inherent variability would 
be expected for firms with business reporting units that are in different phases of the product 
life cycle.  In such firms, some business units would have operating margins similar to growth 
firms while others would have operating margins similar to mature firms. We assume inherent 
differences are beyond management’s control and that, absent intervention or measurement 
error, the reported and inherent range of reported segment profits for a given firm would be 
equal.  We expect the reported and inherent range of reported segment profits to be positively 
correlated. The extent of this association reflects the ‘transparency’ of the reported segment 
earnings data. 
Because the inherent range of segment profits is not observable, we use two proxies for 
the underlying construct.  We begin by computing the annual return on sales (equal to earnings 
before interest and taxes, divided by sales revenue) for all single segment firms operating in 
those four-digit SIC code industries in which a sample firm operates, and which correspond to 
segments that it discloses.  For a firm disclosing K segments in a year, Compustat matches each 
segment to one of the firm’s N four-digit industries, based on the firm’s descriptions of its 
segments. We compute the mean of the return on sales for single segment firms within each of 
the K four-digit SIC code industries in which a sample firm operates, and that Compustat 
identifies with its business segments.  Each of the K annual means is weighted by the relative 
size of the firm’s segment corresponding to the given SIC code industry.  The weight equals the 
segment’s sales, divided by corporate sales. Then we compute the yearly range of the K 
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weighted means (highest weighted mean ROS minus lowest weighted mean ROS). We 
designate this variable InherentProfVar. Because this variable is computed using data for 
multiple, single segment firms in each industry, it is likely to reflect the inherent cross-sectional 
variability of profits in each sample firm’s portfolio of industries.13  
Firms engaging in diverse business activities are likely to have smoother firm-level 
variability of profits over time due to a ‘portfolio’ effect.  In a given year, unusually high 
profitability in one activity (industry) tends to be offset by unusually low profitability in 
another, uncorrelated industry. Thus, reduced firm-level profit variance over time results from 
greater activity-level profit variance within each year. Our variable Diverse reflects the 
diversity of the industries in which a firm operates.  It is the number of the firm’s different two-
digit SIC code industries. For example, Diverse would be coded as two for a firm operating in 
SIC industries 2819, 2899, 3334, and 3355, and as one for a firm operating only in SIC 
industries 2819 and 2899.14 
2.2.3. Disclosure rule 
Managers’ responses to the Exposure Draft preceding SFAS No. 131 indicate that they 
expected the proposed standard to make it more difficult to conceal differences in segment 
profitability.  Nonetheless, the extent of discretion left to managers in applying SFAS No. 131 
makes it unlikely firms’ ability to suppress differences in segment profitability has been totally 
eliminated.15 Our model includes an indicator variable, FAS131, which is coded ‘one’ in years 
1998-2000, and coded ‘zero’ in years 1994-1996.  Year 1997 is omitted from the pooled data to 
avoid the potential confounding effect of early adoption of SFAS No. 131, or of actions taken 
to prepare for adoption.  We expect the coefficient of the indicator variable to be positive and 
significant if SFAS No. 131 makes it more difficult for managers to engage in cross-segment 
profit smoothing. 
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2.2.4. Proprietary costs incentives to conceal 
Consistent with proprietary cost explanations of segment disclosures, research indicates 
that, prior to SFAS No. 131, fewer segments were reported by firms with higher abnormal 
profitability  (Berger and Hann 2003b) and by firms operating in more concentrated industries 
(Harris 1998).16  AbnProf is an industry-adjusted measure of profits:17   
 
ROAit =IBEI ÷ 0.5×(TAit-1 + TAit); 
AvgROA it = (ROA it + ROA it-1 + ROA it-2) ÷ 3; 
AbnProfit = AvgROA it − 1/(K-1) Σk≠ i, k=1, K AvgROA kt .    (1) 
 
ROA is defined as income before extraordinary items, divided by average total assets. The 
three-year average of ROA is denoted AvgROA. Abnormal profitability is computed as a sample 
firm’s AvgROA minus the mean of AvgROA across K industries.  The K industries are those 
four-digit SIC code industries that Compustat identifies with the sample firm’s K disclosed 
business segments.18 Firms with high AbnProf must have one or more segments that are highly 
profitable. We expect the coefficient of AbnProf to be negative, reflecting incentives to conceal 
information about differences in segment profitability that could help competitors. However, it 
is possible that managers of unusually profitable firms have greater capital markets incentives 
to reveal the sources of their firms’ profitability.  Given both proprietary cost incentives to 
conceal abnormal profitability, and capital market incentives to reveal, the resulting coefficient 
of AbnProf could be positive or negative. Our expectation of a negative coefficient assumes 
that capital market incentives to reveal are largely captured by the ExternalFin variable 
introduced below.  
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Harris (1998) argues that the threat of competitive entry depends not only on the 
magnitude of profits at risk but also on the ability of a firm’s competitors to attack such profits.  
In a highly competitive line of business, numerous, relatively small producers earn the same 
competitive returns.19  There are no abnormal profits to protect and therefore no incentive to 
conceal information.  The setting in which a firm has incentives to conceal is one in which the 
firm seeks to protect abnormal profits from a few powerful current or potential competitors.  
The variable we use to capture this aspect of incentives to conceal is a weighted-average four-
firm concentration ratio for the industries in which a firm operates, Concentration.  For a firm 
disclosing K segments in a year, we compute a concentration ratio for each of K industries that 
Compustat matches to the disclosed segments. Concentration is the weighted average of the K 
matched-industry concentration ratios, with each ratio weighted by the appropriate segment’s 
annual revenue, divided by corporate annual revenue.  Using the weighted average of the K 
concentration ratios assumes that managers are concerned about competitors in all of a firm’s 
industries, in proportion to the importance of each industry to the firm as measured by segment 
revenues.20  
2.2.5. Capital market incentives to reveal 
We control for managers’ capital market incentives to reveal cross-segment differences 
in profitability using a variable representing a firm’s need for external financing.  For a given 
year, ExternalFin is the net amount of capital a firm raises through debt or equity issuances in 
the subsequent two years.  It is calculated as the two-year sum of net equity financing and net 
debt financing, from the statement of cash flows, divided by average total assets:  
 ExternalFint =  [ΣT=t+1, t+2 (EQTY_ISST – EQTY_REPT – DIVT)  
  + ΣT=t+1, t+2 (LTD_ISST – LTD_REPT)] ÷ 0.5×(TA t-1 + TA t)  (2) 
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where:  
  
  EQTY_ISST =  cash proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock for T = t+1 and 
t+2,  
EQTY_REPT =  cash payments for the purchase of common and preferred stock for T = t+1 
and t+2, 
 DIVT =  cash payments for dividends for T = t+1 and t+2, 
 LTD_ISST =  cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt for T = t+1 and t+2, 
 LTD_REPT =  cash payments for long-term debt reductions (Compustat item #114) for T 
= t+1 and t+2. 
 
The coefficient of ExternalFin should be positive, indicating that firms that rely more heavily 
on external capital are more willing to reveal the segments that contribute most to firm-level 
profitability.  
2.2.6. Control variables 
We include four control variables in our model: firm size, firm complexity, number of 
reported segments, and segment aggregation. Firm size and complexity could influence 
segment disclosures in conflicting ways.  Respondents to the Exposure Draft preceding SFAS 
No. 131 asserted that large, complex firms have greater ability to define reportable segments 
and to develop cost allocation schemes that conceal differences in segment profitability.  This 
response suggests a negative association of reported cross-segment variability with firm size 
and complexity. A positive association is suggested by the literature asserting that large, 
complex firms have capital market incentives to disclose operating diversity.  Our size measure 
is the natural logarithm of firm sales, Size.  Our measure of firm complexity, Complexity, is the 
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square root of the sum of the number of products a firm produces and the number of geographic 
areas in which it operates.  We do not specify a sign expectation for either variable.    
Prior research (e.g., Harris 1998) indicates that managers choose to disclose fewer 
segments in order to reduce proprietary costs.  The number of reported segments also can 
reflect structural changes, such as acquisitions and divestitures, as well as changes in segment 
disclosure rules.  In addition, statistically, the range of a random variable is expected to 
increase as the number of independent observations used to compute the range increases. Thus 
our dependent variable, ReptdProfVar, should be positively associated with NumberSegs, the 
number of reported segments that contribute ROS observations for computation of annual 
ReptdProfVar. Because we estimate our model using pooled data for firms reporting different 
numbers of segments, we include NumberSegs, number of reported segments per year, as a 
control variable.  NumberSegs arguably reflects a mixture of underlying factors, including 
managers’ attempts to conceal segment information, and the segment reporting rules in effect. 
To the extent NumberSegs reflects reporting requirements in effect, employing this variable 
allows us to determine whether SFAS No. 131 increased variability of segment ROS other than 
through its effect on number of segments.  
Another control variable captures the effect of industry aggregation on the variability of 
ROS across reported segments (our dependent variable.)  Most firms report a smaller number of 
segments than the number of four-digit SIC code industries in which they operate.  Such 
aggregation decreases the variability of ROS across reported segments by making each 
segment’s ROS the outcome for a portfolio of different industries.  Proxy SegAggregation is 
computed as the number of four-digit SIC codes that Compustat assigns a firm, divided by the 
number of segments the firm reports each year, NumberSegs.  Because variable 
SegAggregation includes NumberSegs, employing variable SegAggregation again helps us to 
Ettredge, Michael. (2006) The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment  
Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms.  Review of Accounting Studies, 91-117.  Publisher's Official Version:  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-006-6397-9#page-1>. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 18
determine whether SFAS No. 131 increased variability of segment ROS other than through its 
effect on number of segments. We expect the coefficient of SegAggregation to be negative. 
2.3 Empirical models 
Our primary model is: 
ReptdProfVarit =  α0  + β1InherentProfVarit +  β2Diverseit  + β3FAS131it + β4AbnProfit   
+ β5Concentrationit + β6ExternalFinit +β7Sizeit + β8Complexityit  
+ β9NumberSegsit + β10SegAggregationit + εit     (3)                                
where:  
ReptdProfVar = range of a firm’s segment returns on sales for each year:  the largest return 
on sales minus the smallest.  Return on sales equals a segment’s operating 
profits, as defined by the firm, divided by total segment sales revenue.  
InherentProfVar =  range of the K weighted means (highest weighted mean ROS minus lowest 
weighted mean ROS) for single-segment firms within each of the K four-digit 
SIC code industries in which a sample firm operates, and that Compustat 
identifies with its business segments.  Each of the K annual means is weighted 
by the relative size (sales) of the firm’s segment corresponding to the given 
SIC code industry. (+). 
Diverse    = number of different two-digit SIC industries in which firm operates. (+). 
FAS131 = equals ‘one’ in each of the years since SFAS No. 131 was issued (1998-
2000) and ‘zero’ in preceding years (1994-1996). (+). 
AbnProf = sample firm’s AvgROA minus the mean of AvgROA across K industries. 
AvgROA is the three-year average of ROA (for preceding years). ROA is 
defined as income before extraordinary items (IBEI) divided by average total 
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assets. The K industries are those four-digit SIC code industries that 
Compustat identifies with the sample firm’s K disclosed business segments.  
   (-). 
Concentration    = weighted average of four-firm concentration ratios for the four-digit SIC 
code industries matched with the firm’s disclosed segments by Compustat.  
Each industry concentration ratio is weighted by the ratio of the matched 
segment’s revenue divided by corporate revenue for that year. (-). 
ExternalFin  = the sum over the succeeding two years of net equity financing and net debt 
financing, from the statement of cash flows, divided by average total assets. 
(+). 
Size     = natural logarithm of total corporate revenues for each year. (?).   
Complexity        = square root of the sum of the number of products that a firm  
   produces and the number of geographic areas in which the firm operates.  
   The number of products is increased by ‘one’ if a disclosed principal 
   product has sales.  The number of geographical areas is the number of 
   non-zero GARE data items in the Segment Customers File. (?).  
NumberSegs    = number of reported segments disclosed in a given year. (+). 
SegAggregation = number of four-digit SIC codes Compustat assigns a firm,  
     divided by the number of segments the firm reports each year. (-). 
We estimate the model using data pooled over years.  An approach recommended by Fama-
MacBeth (1973) is used to mitigate overstatement of coefficient p-values that might occur 
when using data that are pooled across years.21  
 
3. Sample and Data 
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Our sample selection (documented in table 1) begins with all firms having business 
segment data available on the Compustat Segment Item Value File22 for any year from 1994-
2000, a period including both pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 segment disclosures (row A).  We 
eliminate firms that did not disclose: two or more segments post-SFAS No. 131, segment 
operating income or segment sales, and required financial statement information on the 
Compustat Industrial Annual File (resulting in the samples shown in rows B and C).   The 
firms that are left have valid observations before and after SFAS No. 131 (the sample shown in 
row D).  Approximately two-thirds of these firms did not report multiple segments until after 
SFAS No. 131 (the sample in row E, referred to as S-M firms).23  The remaining third of the 
firms reported multiple segments before and after SFAS No. 131 (the sample shown in row F, 
referred to as M-M firms). The number of M-M firms, reporting two or more segments and 
having the required financial statement data, ranges from a minimum of 1,033 in 1994 to a 
maximum of 1,293 in 1996. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Past research has concentrated on the increase in the number of segments companies 
disclose as a result of SFAS No. 131. This focus is warranted for S-M firms. However, it can 
result in misleading inferences about the effects of SFAS No. 131 for M-M firms.  Table 2 
reports descriptive statistics for the total sample, S-M firms and M-M firms for size proxies and 
explanatory variables from our main empirical model.  It documents size and other important 
differences between S-M and M-M firms, by showing that the market capitalization of the 
average M-M firm is four times greater than that of the average S-M firm, while average total 
assets are five times greater.  Means and medians are significantly different for all explanatory 
variables. M-M firms are more diverse, profitable, and complex, but less dependent on external 
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financing than S-M firms. These data provide evidence that the average M-M firm is different 
and arguably more economically important than the average S-M firm.    
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 provides evidence on the number of segments and reported profit variability for 
S-M and M-M firms.  The left-hand columns report changes in the number of segments using 
the number of pre-SFAS No. 131 segments as the grouping criterion.   Consistent with earlier 
studies (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003a, Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Street et. al. 2000), the 
mean number of segments increased significantly for S-M firms, from one to over three, in the 
post period.  Results are more mixed for M-M firms.  M-M firms with two, three or four 
segments in the SFAS No. 131 period experienced significant increases in the mean number of 
segments. However, the increases are less than one segment (about one-half segment) for each 
group.  This suggests that changes in segments for the under-five groups were not uniformly 
increasing.  For companies disclosing five segments in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, the data 
do not reject the null of no change. Finally, for the greater-than-five segment group, there is a 
significant decrease in the mean number of reported segments.24 Given that the median and 
mean numbers of segments for M-M firms in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period equal and exceed 
five (see table 2), our table 3 results indicate that the predominant effect of SFAS No. 131 on 
M-M firms was no change in segment numbers, or even decreases. The reasoning employed in 
prior studies would suggest that SFAS No. 131 caused no change (or a decline) in the 
information provided by segment disclosures for companies reporting five (or more than five) 
segments in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period. 
Table 3 also reports changes in ReptProfVar. These results lead to somewhat different 
conclusions about SFAS No. 131’s effects on disclosure by M-M companies. The variability of 
segment earnings does not significantly increase in the post-SFAS No. 131 period for M-M 
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companies reporting two or three segments in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, even though their 
mean numbers of segments increased. On the other hand, the variability of segment profits 
increases significantly for the more numerous companies reporting four or more segments in 
the pre-SFAS No. 131 period. Particularly striking is the fact that variability of segment profits, 
ReptProfVar, increases significantly for firms reporting six or more segments prior to SFAS 
No. 131, even though mean numbers of segments decreased.25 These results suggest that the 
use of ReptProfVar, rather than changes in numbers of segments, leads to some differences in 
inferences about SFAS No. 131’s effects on segment disclosure quality (i.e., information about 
operating diversity).26    
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports means, medians and standard deviations for the dependent variable, 
cross-segment variability of reported profits (ReptProfVar) for M-M firms.27 We use this 
variable to test our hypotheses. Observations from 1997 are omitted from analyses of pooled 
data so that results are unaffected by early adoptions of SFAS No. 131.28 Means and 
maximums greater than 1.0 occur because some firms report negative as well as positive 
segment profits.29 Consistent with H1, the variability of reported segment profits increased 
from the pre-SFAS No. 131 period (1994-1996) to the post-SFAS No. 131 period (1998-2000). 
All else equal, this is consistent with SFAS No. 131 expanding information about differences in 
the operating gross margins of segments of large, complex firms (M-M). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Taken together tables 1 through 4 provide evidence that a researcher likely would draw 
different conclusions, about the effects of SFAS No. 131, when using a sample of S-M and M-
M firms combined, versus analyzing the groups separately.  Our research design allows us to 
test whether M-M firms revealed more about differences in segment profitability after 
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switching from the industry to management approach of computing segment profits. Focusing 
on firms reporting multiple segments is consistent with Harris (1998) but is different from 
Berger and Hann (2003a and 2003b), whose samples also include firms that did not report 
multiple segments until after SFAS No. 131.  Subsequent tables pertain only to M-M firms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Results for Cross-Sectional Model of Cross-segment Profit Variability 
Table 5 provides evidence on the explanatory power of our empirical model, estimated 
on a (1) pooled and (2) year-by-year basis.  Table 5 also tests H1, using FAS131 as the test 
variable. The coefficients in the column labeled “Pooled” are estimated using pooled pre- and 
post-SFAS No. 131 data. The coefficients in the columns labeled “Year-by-year” are based on 
annual regressions.  In the latter, the t-statistics for the means of coefficients (across years) are 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) adjusted. The adjustment mitigates the overstatement of coefficient p-
values that might occur when using data that are pooled across years.  The “Year-by-year’ 
estimates provide comparisons with the pooled sample results that allow us to cross-check the 
significance levels of independent variables with the exception of FAS 131.  Table 5 indicates 
that F-statistics for both the pooled and year-by-year regressions are significant and that the 
signs of the variables are as predicted except for that of Diverse in the pooled regression.  
The estimated coefficients for InherentProfVar are positive and significant as expected. 
The estimated coefficients for variable Diverse are mixed, suggesting that this metric is less 
useful proxy for inherent variance. The positive and significant coefficient of FAS131 indicates 
an increase in the cross-segment variability of reported profits subsequent to the adoption of 
SFAS No. 131.  This is consistent with H1 and suggests that use of the ‘management approach’ 
to defining segments is associated with a wider range of reported segment profit margins and so 
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appears to provide investors with additional information that would not have been available had 
firms continued to report using the industry approach.  The fact that FAS131 is significant even 
though a control for the number of segments reported (NumberSegs) is included in the models 
indicates that SFAS No. 131 increased the variability of reported profits other than through its 
effect on numbers of segments reported. 
The coefficients of the proprietary cost variables (AbnProf and Concentration) are 
negative and significant.30  This is consistent with proprietary costs providing incentives for 
management to conceal differences in segment profitability, and is consistent with the results of 
other studies using alternative measures of segment disclosure aggregation, and different 
dependent variables (e.g., Harris 1998; Berger and Hann 2003b). The consistently significant 
and positive coefficient for external financing (ExternalFin) suggests that firms facing stronger 
capital market incentives (i.e., those depending more heavily on external financing) are willing 
to reveal more about differences in segment profitability.31   
The pooled regression results for the control variables also are consistent with 
expectations (when specified), with the exception of Complex, which is not significant.  The 
consistently significant and negative coefficients for control variable Size are consistent with 
ED respondents’ claims that larger firms are better able to conceal differences in segment 
profits.  Control variable SegAggregation reflects the extent to which economic activities are 
aggregated into business segments for reporting purposes.  As expected, coefficients are 
negative and significant, suggesting that higher levels of aggregation are associated with greater 
concealment of differences in segment profitability. The year-by-year regression results with 
Fama-MacBeth adjusted t-statistics provide evidence that generally is consistent with those of 
the pooled regression.   
[Insert table 5 about here] 
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4.2 Investigation of Coefficient Shifts from the Pre- to the Post-SFAS No. 131 Periods 
 Table 6 shows results for separate regressions using pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 data.  
The objective is to determine whether our basic model has explanatory power in both the pre- 
and post-SFAS No. 131 periods, and whether the association between reported variability and 
individual explanatory variables changes in the direction consistent with SFAS No. 131 
increasing the explanatory power of proxies for inherent variability (H2) and reliance on 
external financing (H4), but decreasing the explanatory power of proprietary cost proxies (H3). 
The table indicates the signs expected for each t-statistic (Test of Difference) relevant to tests of 
hypotheses H2 and H3. Positive shifts in the coefficients relating reported variability to proxies 
for inherent variability would be consistent with increased transparency and with H2. Decreases 
in the association between reported variability and proxies for proprietary costs (i.e., positive 
shifts in the coefficients, bringing them closer to zero) would be consistent with H3. A positive 
shift in the coefficient of the external financing variable would be consistent with SFAS No. 
131 improving the ability of managers to reveal cross-segment variability if desired and with 
H4.32   
 [Insert table 6 about here] 
Our proxies for inherent variability are InherentProfVar in model (3a) and Diverse in 
model (3b). The dependent variable in both models is ReptdProfVar. We expect a positive shift 
in the coefficients of both variables if SFAS No. 131, consistent with H2, increased the 
transparency of segment profit disclosures. In the first model, the coefficient of variable 
InherentProfVar is positive and differs from zero in both the pre- and post-periods. The 
coefficient becomes more positive in the post-period, and the shift in the coefficient differs 
significantly from zero. The positive coefficient of variable Diverse in model (3b) does not 
differ from zero in the pre- period, but does in the post-period. The positive coefficient shift is 
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significant. These results suggest that adoption of SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of 
segment profit disclosures, a result consistent with H2. 
In table 6, the coefficients for AbnProf are consistently significant and negative in both 
periods for both models.  The insignificance of the shifts in slope coefficient from the pre- to 
post-period indicates that SFAS No. 131 did not affect this variable’s association with variance 
of segment profitability. The coefficients of the other proprietary cost variable (Concentration) 
also are negative and significant in both the pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 periods.  Similarly, 
the shifts in the coefficients across periods are not significant.  These results are not consistent 
with H3.  Combined with our findings that the cross-segment variability of reported segment 
profits increased after the effective date of SFAS No. 131, they suggest that mandated use of 
the management method improved transparency of segment profitability, but did not eliminate 
management’s ability to conceal competitively harmful cross-segment differences.  
The positive association between the dependent variable and the need for external 
financing is significantly different from zero in both the pre- and post-periods. Consistent with 
H4, the coefficients increase from the pre- to post-SFAS No. 131 periods.  Changes also occur 
in control variables. The coefficient for variable Size becomes more negative after adoption of 
SFAS No. 131, indicating that larger firms disclosed less variability in the post- period, other 
things equal. In contrast, the coefficient for variable Complex becomes less negative after 
adoption of SFAS No. 131. The coefficient of NumberSegs becomes less positive in the post-
period.  Finally, the coefficient of SegAggregation does not change from pre- to post-SFAS No. 
131. 
 In summary, table 6 provides evidence consistent with H2 and H4, but not consistent 
with H3. In general, proxies for inherent variability and for high external financing are more 
strongly associated with the dependent variable in the post- period. Coefficients of proxies for 
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proprietary cost incentives to conceal variability do not change significantly in the post  period, 
while control variables tend to explain somewhat less in the post- period (as captured by slope 
coefficients and significance levels).  
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
 Managers’ incentives to conceal information about the profitability of specific segments 
could vary.   For example, some managers may have incentives to conceal information about a 
high profit segment (i.e., reduce the range of reported segment profits) only if the high profit 
segment contributes significantly to overall corporate-level profits (i.e., accounts for a large 
percentage of corporate revenues).  Arguably, such managers would be unconcerned about 
concealing information if the most profitable segment was small and contributed little to overall 
corporate profit.  The quantitative thresholds of SFAS No. 131 make it unlikely that firms 
disclose information for segments small enough to be considered immaterial.33  Nonetheless, an 
empirical question remains as to whether our results hold for alternative versions of 
ReptdProfVar, especially versions that are size-adjusted.  We investigate this possibility by 
conducting sensitivity analyses using alternative specifications of ReptProfVar. 
 Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for three alternative measures.  
ReptdProfVar_LrgAvg is the difference between the ROS of the largest segment and the mean 
ROS across segments. This dependent variable captures the difference in profitability between 
the segment with the largest revenue contribution and the mean ROS of other segments.  The 
measure will be negative when the ROS of the largest segment is less than the average of 
segment ROS. ReptdProfVar_Xsml is the range of a firm’s ROS after dropping the segment 
with smallest segment revenues.  This alternative specification of the cross-segment variability 
of profit margins explicitly takes into account segment size by removing the effect of segments 
that are too small to protect, or that contribute little to corporate income. Finally, 
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ReptdProfVar_Le1 is the range of a firm’s segment ROS with truncation at 1 if the value is 
greater than 1.  This final measure removes potential outlying segment profit margins by 
restricting the range calculation to a ‘normal’ range of profit margins. 
 We calculate t-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics for a comparison of pre- and post 
SFAS No. 131 measures of each alternative.  Table 7 indicates that the differences are in the 
direction anticipated and significant for all three alternative specifications.  These results 
provide support for our conclusion that the change in ReptProfVar is related to the adoption of 
SFAS No. 131 rather than to the way we compute cross-segment profit variability.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 We re-estimate our primary model (table 5) by replacing ReptProfVar with each 
alternative dependent variable discussed above.  Two columns are presented for each version of 
the dependent variable: one for a pooled model and the other for the year-by-year model. 
Results, reported in table 8, are consistent with results for H1 reported previously. The positive 
and significant coefficients of FAS131 using the three variants of ReptProfVar, and for both 
models, indicate an increase in the cross-segment variability of reported profits subsequent to 
adoption of SFAS No. 131, which is consistent with H1.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 In summary, our sensitivity analyses indicate our results are not sensitive to three 
alternative specifications of ReptdProfVar that adjust for segment size, and/or that truncate the 
effects on the dependent variable of unusually large segment profits and losses. These results 
strengthen the support for our conclusion that multiple segment firms revealed more about 
difference in segment profitability and provided more transparent segment disclosures after 
adopting SFAS No. 131. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 The objective of our study is to assess the effect of SFAS No. 131 on the segment 
profitability disclosures of the large, complex firms that reported multiple segments before as 
well as after SFAS No. 131.   Our analysis begins by documenting economic differences 
between firms that reported multiple segments throughout the test period (continuous multiple 
segment reporters, M-M firms) and those that did not report multiple segments until after SFAS 
No. 131.  We find that M-M firms are larger and more complex, and that many of them did not 
increase the number of reported segments after SFAS No. 131.   
Assessing the effect of SFAS No. 131 on these firms by comparing the number of 
segments reported before and after enactment of the statement, as has been done in earlier 
studies (e.g., Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Street et al. 2000), would lead us to conclude the 
switch from the industry to management approach to identifying segment required by SFAS 
No. 131 did not improve information about operating diversity for the majority of M-M firms.  
Rather than prematurely draw this conclusion, we employ an alternative metric – the cross-
segment variability of reported profits – to assess the effect of SFAS No. 131 on M-M firms.  
Our use of this metric is motivated by criteria in SFAS No. 131 that are intended to discourage 
M-M firms from aggregating segments with different economic characteristics such as 
profitability.  If firms used the SFAS No. 131 aggregation criteria as intended, the cross-
segment variability of reported segment profits should have increased after SFAS No. 131. 
We document an average increase in the cross-segment variability of reported profits of 
M-M firms after SFAS No. 131.  To determine whether this increase is attributable to the 
adoption of SFAS No. 131, we develop and test models that also include other factors that 
could affect the cross-segment variability of reported profits: the cross-segment variability that 
would exist absent incentives to conceal differences (inherent variability), proprietary costs, 
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and market incentives to reveal value-relevant segment information.  We find a post-SFAS No. 
131 increase in the association between proxies for reported and inherent cross-segment profit 
variability, an increase in positive association between these disclosures and capital market 
disclosure incentives, and a continuing but decreased effect of proprietary costs on segment 
profitability disclosures. We interpret our results as indicating that SFAS No. 131 increased the 
transparency of reported segment profitability, allowed firms that depend more on external 
financing to disclose more about differences in segment profitability, but continued to allow 
managers of high proprietary cost firms some ability to conceal competitively harmful 
information about differences in segment profitability.  Our results add to the existing findings 
on the effects of SFAS No. 131 on segment disclosure (e.g., Berger and Hann 2003a; Herrmann 
and Thomas 2000; Street et al. 2000) by providing evidence SFAS No. 131 increased 
information about operating diversity even for M-M firms that did not report more segments 
after SFAS No. 131. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure  
 
Sample selection 
criteria 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
A. Number of firms 
whose segments are 
defined as business 
segments a  
5,248 5,827 6,307 6,632 7,473 7,838 7,903 47,228 
B. Number of firms 
that disclosed two 
or more segments in 
the post-131 period  
4,676 5,487 5,845 5,763 5,828 5,311 5,676 38,586 
C. Number of firms 
for which required 
financial statements 
data (e.g., segment 
operating earnings 
and segment sales) 
are available 
4,492 5,245 5,604 5,557 5,587 5,587 4,964 36,407 
D. Number of 
qualifying firms 
that existed in both 
pre-131 and post-
131 period 
4,277 5,076 5,540 5,418 5,359 4,624 4,626 34,920 
E. Number of firms  
becoming multi-
segment after 
adoption of SFAS 
No. 131 
(S-M Firms ) b 
 
3,244 
 
 
3,912 
 
 
4,247 
 
 
4,218 
 
 
4,198 
 
 
3,497 
 
 
3,560 
 
 
26,876 
 
F. M-M Firms 
Test Sample c  
 
1,033 
 
 
1,164 
 
 
1,293 
 
 
1,200 
 
 
1,161 
 
 
1,127 
 
 
1,066 
 
 
8,044 
 
 
a Segment data are obtained from the Segment Item Value File, which is a subset of the 
COMPUSTAT Business Information File, which is a companion to the Industrial Annual 
Files. The Business Information File consists of nine subset files such as Segment Customers 
File, Segment Products File, and Segment Detail File as well as Segment Item Value File. 
Based on the segment definition provided by Compustat Segment Item Files, we include 
firm-years only if a segment is defined as a business segment.  
b The S-M sample firms did not disclose segment data in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but did 
disclose multiple segments in at least one year after SFAS No. 131 became effective. Thus 
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they are single segment disclosers in the pre- period and multiple segment disclosers in the 
post- SFAS No. 131 period.  
c The M-M sample includes firms that disclosed segment data in 1996 and in at least one year 
after SFAS No. 131 became effective. Thus they are multiple segment disclosers in both the 
pre- and post- SFAS No. 131 periods. Firms that disclosed multiple segments in one or more 
years of the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but did not disclose multiple segments in the post 
period, are dropped from the M-M sample.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Explanatory Variables:  
Pre-SFAS No. 131 Period mean/(median)/standard deviation 
 
Variables 
Total 
sample 
(N=14,893)
S-M a Firms 
(N=11,403) 
M-M b 
Firms 
(N=3,490)
t-
statistic 
(p-
value) 
Wilcoxon 
z 
(p-value) 
Market 
Capitalization 
1502.58 c 
(106.29) 
6408 
839.93 
(81.80) 
4345.67 
3470.31 
(348.47) 
10090.43
-14.19 
(.0001) 
-25.74 
(.0001) Proxies for 
Firm Size  Total  
Assets 
2238.57 
(86.81) 
12459.06 
1097.05 
(58.43) 
8595.39 
5968.30 
(482.52) 
20073.40
-13.95 
(.0001) 
-37.01 
(.0001) 
InherentProfVar 
1.5701 
(1.5909) 
1.1117 
1.6684 
(1.5909) 
1.1704 
1.2490 
(1.2094) 
0.8150 
19.75 
(.0001) 
21.37 
(.0001) Proxies for 
inherent 
variability Diverse 
1.5934 
(1.0000) 
0.9967 
1.3250 
(1.0000) 
0.4691 
2.4705 
(2.0000) 
1.5863 
-42.10 
(.0001) 
-45.53 
(.0001) 
AbnProf 
-0.0164 
(0.0029) 
0.1838 
-0.0215 
(0.0033) 
0.2051 
0.0026 
(0.0017) 
0.0803 
-6.12 
(.0001) 
-6.40 
(.0001) Proxies for  
proprietary 
costs Concentration 
0.6414 
(0.6712) 
0.2329 
0.6597 
(0.6820) 
0.2203 
0.5818 
(0.6159) 
0.2615 
15.95 
(.0001) 
14.60 
(.0001) 
Proxies for  
incentives 
to reveal 
ExternalFin 
0.0864 
(0.0000) 
0.3021 
0.1076 
(0.0000) 
0.3346 
0.0169 
(0.0000) 
0.1325 
15.64 
(.0001) 
16.51 
(.0001) 
Size 
1419.66 
(82.24) 
6796.05 
675.57 
(53.29) 
4018.19 
3850.87 
(467.14) 
11689.72
-31.88 
(.0001) 
-37.01 
(.0001) 
Complexity 
1.6831 
(1.4142) 
0.5391 
1.6325 
(1.4142) 
0.4875 
1.8483 
(1.4142) 
0.6542 
-18.02 
(.0001) 
-17.99 
(.0001) 
NumberSegs 
 
N.A. 
 
 
N.A. 
 
5.4043 
(5.0000) 
1.6925 
 
N.A. 
 
 
N.A. 
 
Control  
Variables 
SegAggregation 
 
N.A. 
 
 
N.A. 
 
1.0941 
(1.0000) 
0.2117 
 
N.A. 
 
 
N.A. 
 
 
(continued) 
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a The S-M sample firms did not disclose segment data in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but 
did disclose multiple segments in at least one year after SFAS No. 131 became effective. 
Thus they are single segment reporters in the pre- period and multiple segment reporters in 
the post- SFAS No. 131 period. 
b The M-M sample includes firms that disclosed segment data in 1996 and in at least one year 
after SFAS No. 131 became effective. Thus they are multiple segment reporters in both the 
pre- and post- SFAS No. 131 periods. Firms that disclosed multiple segments in one or more 
years of the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but did not disclose multiple segments in the post- 
period, are dropped from the M-M sample. 
c Each table cell describing the total sample or S-M or M-M firms contains the mean / (median) 
/ standard deviation. 
InherentProfVar = the range of the means of return on sales for single segment firms in all 
four-digit SIC code industries reported as segments, weighted using the relative size of the 
segments. This is a proxy for the inherent variability of earnings in the industries in which a 
firm operates. 
Diverse = the number of different two-digit SIC industries in which a firm operates. This is a 
proxy for the inherent variability of earnings arising from the variety of industries in which a 
firm operates.  
AbnProf = the industry-adjusted measure of profits, 
 AVGROA it − 1/(J-1) Σj≠ i, j=1, J AVGROA it  
where AVGROA it is the three-year average of ROA for firm i at t, and 1/(J-1) Σj≠ i, j=1, J 
AVGROA it for J firms in the industry in which firm i operates is the industry average of 
three-year average of ROA, excluding firm i’s average of ROA. This variable captures 
abnormal profits that attract entrants.  
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Concentration = the weighted average of four-firm concentration ratios for the four-digit SIC 
code industries matched with the firm’s disclosed segments by Compustat. Each industry 
concentration ratio is weighted by the ratio of the matched segment’s revenue divided by 
corporate revenue for that year.  
ExternalFin = the net amount of capital a firm raises through debt or equity issuance in the two 
years after year t, calculated as the sum of net equity financing from the statement of cash 
flows and net debt financing from the statement of cash flows over two-years period. This 
variable captures the need for external financing, proxying for a countervailing incentive to 
reveal variability. We obtain information on the gross amount of securities issuances and 
retirements/repurchases from the statement of cash flows. 
Size = the natural logarithm of total corporate revenues for each year. Descriptive statistics for 
Size are given prior to logarithmic transformation.  
Complexity = the square root of the sum of the number of products that a firm produces and the 
number of geographic areas in which the firm operates. The numbers of products are 
increased by ‘one’ if a disclosed principal  product has sales (i.e., PSALE data item in 
Segment Products File is greater than zero). The number of geographical areas is the number 
of non-zero GARE data items in Segment Customers File. 
NumberSegs = the number of reported segments disclosed in a given year. Data are obtained 
from Compustat’s Segment Item Value File. 
SegAggregation = the number of four-digit SIC codes Compustat assigns a firm, divided by the 
number of segments the firm reports each year.  
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Table 3. Comparisons of the Changes in Number of Segments and Changes in Cross-Segment 
Profit Variability for the Pre-SFAS No. 131 Versus the Post-SFAS No.131 Period 
 
NumberSegs a ReptdProfVar b  
 
 Pre-131 Post-131 
t-statistics 
(p-value) Pre-131 Post-131 
t-statistics 
(p-value) 
S-M 
Sample c 1 
3.584 d 
(3.00) 
136.43 
(.0001) ⎯ 
0.9441 
(.0459) ⎯ 
2 2.60 (3.00) 
2.45 
(.0705) 
0.1019 
(0.0914) 
0.1775 
(0.1131) 
0.73 
(.5902) 
3 3.51 (3.00) 
4.02 
(.0001) 
0.5122 
(0.1188) 
0.4756 
(0.2036) 
-0.22 
(.8231) 
4 4.65 (4.00) 
7.18 
(.0001) 
0.4263 
(0.1204) 
0.9542 
(0.1729) 
3.77 
(.0002) 
5 5.02 (5.00) 
0.48 
(.6280) 
0.8775 
(0.1902) 
1.4190 
(0.1939) 
2.95 
(.0034) 
M-M 
Sample e 
≥ 6 5.71 (6.00) 
-12.77 
(.0001) 
0.8285 
(0.2053) 
1.3968 
(0.2464) 
3.81 
(.0002) 
 
a NumberSegs is the number of reported segments disclosed in a given year. Data are obtained 
from Compustat’s Segment Item Value File. 
b ReptdProfVar is the range of a firm’s segment return on sales for each year: the largest return 
on sales minus the smallest.  Return on sales equals a segment’s operating profit, as defined 
by the firm, divided by the segment’s total revenue. 
c The S-M sample firms did not disclose segment data in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but did 
disclose multiple segments in at least one year after SFAS No. 131 became effective. Thus 
they are single segment reporters in the pre- period and multiple segment reporters in the 
post- SFAS No. 131 period. 
d Each table cell (other than for t-statistics) contains the sub-sample mean / (median). 
e The M-M sample includes firms that disclosed segment data in 1996 and in at least one year 
after SFAS No. 131 became effective. Thus they are multiple segment reporters in both the 
pre- and post- SFAS No. 131 periods. Firms that disclosed multiple segments in one or more 
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years of the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, but did not disclose multiple segments in the post- 
period, are dropped from the M-M sample. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable and the Test Sample (M-M Firms) by 
Sub-Period, and Tests for Sub-Period Comparisons 
 
Sample Number of observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max.
a Test statistics
         
ReptdProfVar b        
1994-1996 3,490 0.701 0.164 1.632 0.013 7.9543 12.51
c 
(.0001) 
1998-2000 3,354 1.488 0.240 3.271 0.004 13.1187 10.80 
d 
(.0001) 
1994-1996 & 
1998-2000 6,844 0.998 0.104 2.906 0.004 13.1187  N.A. 
 
a Maximums greater than 1.0 occur because some firms report negative as well as positive 
segment profits. It can have a value greater than 1 since a firm can have negative as well as 
positive segment profits. In addition, a firm can have segment ROSs less than 1, which 
magnifies the range of segment ROSs. The negative value of ROS can occur in the 
circumstance where a segment has a high operating leverage with low sales and high 
operating expenses. 31.69 % of our sample has negative segment profits and 6.34% of the 
sample has the value greater than 1. We replicate our empirical analyses by restricting the 
value of ReptProfVar within the range of ±1, but the results remain unchanged.  
b ReptdProfVar is the range of a firm’s segment return on sales for each year: the largest return 
on sales minus the smallest.  Return on sales equals a segment’s operating profit, as defined 
by the firm, divided by the segment’s total revenue.  
c t-statistic (p-value) for test whether mean for 1994-1996 equals mean for 1998-2000 
d Wilcoxon z-statistic (p-value) for test whether median for 1994-1996 equals mean for 1998-
2000. 
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Table 5. Results of Model (3) Regression with ReptProfVar a as Dependent Variable where 
FAS131 Provides Evidence for Tests of Hypothesis H1 
 
 
Study Variables b Expected Sign Pooled  Year-by-Year 
c 
? 1.4285 1.6762  Intercept 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
 0.0298 0.0216 InherentProfVar 
 (.0001) (.0100) 
+ -0.0089 0.0656 
Proxies for 
inherent 
variability Diverse 
 (.6740) (.0671) 
H1: + 0.2598 ⎯ Proxy for 
disclosure rule 
FAS131 
 (.0002)  
- -2.7087 -2.6447 AbnProf 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
− -0.2976 -0.5663 
Proxies for 
proprietary 
costs Concentration 
 (.0127) (.0005) 
+ 1.1480 1.2935 Proxy for 
incentive to 
reveal 
ExternalFin 
 (.0001) (.0003) 
? -0.1184 -0.1199 Size 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
? -0.0696 -0.1894 Complexity 
 (.1320) (.2568) 
+ 0.1601 0.1625 NumberSegs 
 (.0001) (.0002) 
− -0.3417 -0.3468 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
SegAggregation 
 (.0013) (.0368) 
Number of 
Observations 6,844 6,844 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) 8.78 6.67 
F-statistics 
(p-value) 
66.85 
(.0001) 
50.78 
(.0001) 
 
a Equals the range of a firm’s segment return on sales (RROS) for each year: highest segment 
return on sales minus the lowest.  
b See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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c We report the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results in yearly regressions. The t-statistics 
of the mean coefficients are computed as the mean coefficient divided by the mean standard 
error of the six annual regressions. 
Ettredge, Michael. (2006) The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment  
Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms.  Review of Accounting Studies, 91-117.  Publisher's Official Version:  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-006-6397-9#page-1>. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 45
 
Table 6. Model (3 modified) Regression Results: Tests of Shift in Coefficients between Pre- 
versus Post- SFAS No. 131 Periods 
 
 
 
*/**/*** significant at the 10% / 5% / 1% level  
a See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
Model (3a) Model (3b) 
Study Variablesa Pre-131 Post-131 Test of Difference b Pre-131 Post-131 
Test of 
Difference2
1.0951 2.3074 ⎯ 1.1782 2.4172 ⎯ Intercept 
(.0001) (.0001)  (.0001) (.0001)  
0.0135 0.0304 2.06** N.A. N.A. ⎯ InherentProfVar 
(.0367) (.0002) (.0392)    
Expected sign    H2: +    
N.A. N.A. ⎯ -0.0219 0.1150 3.35*** Diverse 
   (.2344) (.0059) (.0008) 
Expected sign      H2: + 
-2.6850 -2.6203   0.15 -2.6611 -2.4821 0.01 AbnProf 
(.0001) (.0001) (.8846) (.0001) (.0001) (.9902) 
Expected sign   H3: +   H3: + 
-0.3175 -0.7774 -0.86 -0.3505 -0.7566 -0.55 Concentration 
(.0017) (.0004) (.3915) (.0008) (.0006) (.5800) 
Expected sign   H3: +   H3: + 
0.8367 1.7420 1.96** 0.8537 1.8291 2.13** ExternalFin 
(.0001) (.0004) (.0499) (.0001) (.0002) (.0329) 
Expected sign   H4: +   H4: + 
-0.0777 -0.1542 -2.44** -0.0833 -0.1710 -2.82*** Size 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0147) (.0001) (.0001) (.0049) 
-0.3260 -0.0725 3.22*** -0.3208 -0.0401 3.49*** Complex 
(.0001) (.3541) (.0013) (.0001) (.6106) (.0001) 
0.2263 0.1133 -2.05** 0.2375 0.0873 -3.03*** NumberSegs 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0405) (.0001) (.0007) (.0001) 
-0.4178 -0.2564 1.47 -0.3939 -0.3025 1.58 SegAggregation 
(.0012) (.1257) (.1223) (.0024) (.0734) (.1134) 
Number of 
observations 3,490 3,354 ⎯ 3,490 3,354 ⎯ 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) 9.09 6.17 ⎯ 9.02 6.01 ⎯ 
F-statistics 
(p-value) 
44.62 
(.0001) 
38.18 
(.0001) ⎯ 
44.21 
(.0001) 
35.41 
(.0001) ⎯ 
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b t-statistics (p-values). To determine significance levels for tests of shifts in coefficients, we 
estimated a pooled regression (not tabulated) with a POST-131 dichotomous variable 
interacted with each term. 
 
Ettredge, Michael. (2006) The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment  
Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms.  Review of Accounting Studies, 91-117.  Publisher's Official Version:  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-006-6397-9#page-1>. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 47
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Specifications of ReptdProfVar that Incorporate 
Measures of the Importance of Segment Size, and Tests for Sub-Period Comparisons 
 
Sample Number of observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max.
a Test statistics 
ReptdProfVar_LrgAvg b        
1994-1996 3,490 0.167 -0.097 1.332 -7.009 6.818 7.93 
c 
(.0001) 
1998-2000 3,354 0.606 -0.034 2.926 -6.355 8.292 15.17 
d 
(.0001) 
ReptdProfVar_Xsml e        
1994-1996 3,490 0.124 0.023 0.222 0.013 1.269 17.41 (.0001) 
1998-2000 3,354 0.872 0.130 2.479 0.011 13.281 25.40 (.0001) 
ReptdProfVar_Le1 f        
1994-1996 3,490 0.311 0.165 0.329 0.013 1.000 11.50 (.0001) 
1998-2000 3,354 0.409 0.240 0.376 0.004 1.000 10.54 (.0001) 
 
a Maximums greater than 1.0 occur because some firms report negative as well as positive 
segment profits. It can have a value greater than 1 since a firm can have negative as well as 
positive segment profits. In addition, a firm can have segment ROSs less than 1, which 
magnifies the range of segment ROSs. The negative value of ROS can occur in the 
circumstance where a segment has a high operating leverage with low sales and high 
operating expenses. 31.69 % of our sample has negative segment profits and 6.34% of the 
sample has the value greater than  
b ReptdProfVar_LrgAvg is the difference between ROS of the largest segment and the average 
of segment ROS. This variable can have negative values because ROS of the largest segment 
may be less than the average of segment ROS.  
c t-statistic (p-value) for test whether mean for 1994-1996 equals mean for 1998-2000 
d Wilcoxon z-statistic (p-value) for test whether median for 1994-1996 equals mean for 1998-
2000. 
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e ReptdProfVar_Xsml is the range in a firm’s segment return on sales for each year after 
dropping the smallest segment by segment sales.  
f ReptdProfVar_Le1 is the range in a firm’s segment return on sales for each year with 
truncation at 1 if the value is greater than 1.  
 
 
Ettredge, Michael. (2006) The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment  
Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms.  Review of Accounting Studies, 91-117.  Publisher's Official Version:  
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-006-6397-9#page-1>. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 49
Table 8. Results of Model (3) Regression: Sensitivity Analyses Using Alternative Measures  
of the Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent Variables  
ReptdProfVar_LrgAvga ReptdProfVar_Xsml b ReptdProfVar_LeI c 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Expected  
Sign Pooled  
Sample 
Year-by-
Year d 
Pooled  
Sample 
Year-by-
Year d 
Pooled  
Sample 
Year-by-
Year d 
? 0.7455 0.9382 0.2565 0.6451 0.4495 0.3863 Intercept 
 (.0001) (.0003) (.0001) (.1168) (.0001) (.0001) 
+ 0.0171 0.0169 0.0132 0.0071 0.0759 0.0091 InherentProfVar 
 (.0004) (.0181) (.0004) (.0552) (.0001) (.0001) 
+ -0.0131 -0.0167 -0.0168 0.0455 0.0072 0.0141 Diverse 
 (.4857) (.4834) (.2380) (.0607) (.0102) (.2359) 
H1: + 0.3531 ⎯ 0.2355 ⎯ 0.0301 ⎯ FAS131 
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0009)  
− -3.7138 -3.5448 -0.7605 -0.6438 -0.4850 -0.4993 AbnProf 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0015) (.0077) (.0001) (.0001) 
− -0.0714 -0.0839 -0.0370 -0.3199 -0.0973 -0.1310 Concentration 
 (.4974) (.4802) (.6441) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001) 
+ 1.2628 1.4124 0.4591 0.6466 0.1247 0.1244 ExternalFin 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0059) (.0278) (.0001) (.0187) 
? -0.1255 -0.1296 -0.0866 -0.0768 -0.0248 -0.0235 Size 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
? 0.0794 -0.0113 -0.0140 -0.0612 -0.0184 -0.0617 Complexity 
 (.0514) (.0905) (.6515) (.2812) (.0023) (.4864) 
+ 0.0274 0.0669 0.1676 0.0884 0.0328 0.0470 NumberSegs 
 (.0050) (.0256) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
− -0.0970 -0.1414 -0.1130 -0.0985 -0.0612 -0.0568 SegAggretation 
 (.3000) (.3979) (.1127) (.4500) (.0001) (.0162) 
Number of 
Observations 6,844 6,844 6,844 6,844 6,844 6,844 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) 6.97 8.05 12.62 13.28 17.63 15.60 
F-statistics 
(p-value) 
52.31 
(.0001) 
60.42 
(.0001) 
99.84 
(.0001) 
104.90 
(.0001) 
147.46 
(.0001) 
130.48 
(.0001) 
 
a ReptProfVar_LrgAvg is the difference between ROS of the largest segment and the average of 
segment ROS. This variable can have negative values because ROS of the largest segment 
may be less than the average of segment ROS.  
b ReptProfVar_Xsml is the range in a firm’s segment return on sales for each year after 
dropping the smallest segment (as measured by segment sales).  
c ReptProfVar_Le1 is the range in a firm’s segment return on sales for each year with truncation 
at 1 if the value is greater than 1.  
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d We report the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results in yearly regressions. The t-statistics 
of the mean coefficients are computed as the mean coefficient divided by the mean standard 
error of the six annual regressions all multiplied by the square root of six minus one. This 
controls for the assumption of independence.   
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Notes 
1 SFAS No. 14, Financial Reporting by Segments of a Business Enterprise (FASB 1976), 
provided segment disclosure guidelines prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 131. Analysts have 
described segment data as “vital” to their work and have characterized SFAS No. 14 as 
resulting in disclosure that did not reveal how various components of a business behave 
economically (Knutson 1993: 59). 
2 The industry approach under SFAS No. 14 (also referred to as line of business reporting) 
defined segments in terms of the industries in which a firm had significant business activities.  
The management approach under SFAS No. 131 defines segments to reflect the way the firm is 
managed internally. When these approaches differ, adoption of SFAS No. 131 could result in 
decreases, increases, or no change in numbers of reported segments. The expectation of non-
increasing changes was indicated by Air Products in its June 20, 1996 comment letter to the 
FASB: “One of the objectives of the proposed standard is to increase the number of segments 
reported. On the basis of the exposure draft’s criteria for segment determination we would 
decrease (emphasis added) the segments reported from four to three.”   
3 Berger and Hann (2003b) use cross-segment variability of segment profits as an explanatory 
variable proxying for within firm heterogeneity in segment profits. 
4 SFAS No. 131 (in Question 8 of Q&A 131--Segment Information: Guidance on Applying 
Statement 131) states that “operating segments often exhibit similar long-term financial 
performance if they have similar economic characteristics. For example, similar long-term 
average gross margins for two operating segments would be expected if their economic 
characteristics were similar.” The Q & A goes on to say “that [profit margins are] used only as 
an example, because gross margin is a measure of profitability that is less likely to be affected 
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by allocations.”  FASB (2005) includes gross margin as an example of a quantitative factor that 
might be considered for purposes of determining whether operating segments have similar 
economic characteristics. 
5 SFAS No. 131 provides no definition of how segment profits are to be computed.  Instead, 
reported segment profits are to be the same measures the chief operating decision maker uses 
internally to asses performance and allocate resources. Thus segment profits need not be 
measured in accordance with GAAP. 
6 Managers also warned of competitive harm in responding to the ED preceding SFAS No. 14 
(Sprouse 1969). Responding managers did not acknowledge that they might benefit from the 
increased disclosure of competitors. 
7 Control variables include the expected size of a segment’s operations relative to the size of the 
firm, the number of industries in which the firm operates, and the heterogeneity of earnings 
persistence across segments. 
8 This variable is the same as the speed of profit adjustment variable in Harris (1998). 
9 Chen and Zhang’s (2003) analysis does not consider the possible effect of proprietary costs. 
10 Comment letters responding to Issue 2 in the request for comment on the ED suggest that the 
criteria found in paragraphs 11-19 of the ED would force managers to redefine company 
segments based upon the similarity and dissimilarity of profit margins related to a company’s 
outputs. 
11 Most firms report a small number of segments. In Chen and Zhang’s (2003) sample of firms 
reporting more than one segment, 88% reported two, three, or four segments while only 12% 
reported five or more.  Comparable results are obtained when we operationalize the dependent 
variable as the standard deviation of ROS rather than the range. 
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12 Other measures of segment profit sometimes disclosed are income after depreciation, pretax 
income, income before extraordinary items, and net income.  None of these is reported 
frequently enough by firms in our sample to be used in empirical testing. 
13 We also test an alternative to InherentProfVar. We first compute the range of ROS for single-
segment firms in each of the N industries. We then compute the mean of the N ranges. Our 
results using this variable are very similar to those using InherentProfVar and so we have 
chosen not to table these results. 
14 Diverse is an example of a business count measure of diversification. See Martin and Sayrak 
(2003) for discussion. 
15 SFAS No. 131 does not require segment information be provided in accordance with the 
same generally accepted accounting principles used to prepare consolidated financial 
statements.  It provides some disclosure of how a firm allocates joint costs, jointly used assets, 
or jointly incurred liabilities to segments, and how inter-segment transfers are priced (Appendix 
A, paragraph 84). 
16 Proprietary costs also have been used to explain differences in IPO underpricing (Schrand 
and Verrecchia 2002) and environmental reporting (Cormier and Magnan 2003). 
17 Berger and Hann (2003b) also employ an industry-adjusted ROA metric to proxy for 
proprietary costs. The industry adjustment is based on a sample firm’s main SIC code, and 
employs all firms in that SIC code. 
18 For each industry K, we used all single segment firms, available on Compustat, with primary 
SICs in that industry. Use of single segment firms is desirable because they are more subject to 
the inherent variability of profits within that specific industry, than are multiple segment firms. 
The latter are likely to operate in multiple industries. One downside of our procedure is that the 
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single segment firms tend to be smaller than the multiple segment firms in our M-M sample. 
Therefore we also re-estimated abnormal profits using all firms in each industry, rather than 
only single segment firms. Then we repeated our regressions using the revised measures of 
abnormal return. Results are qualitatively unchanged. 
19 We use the term “competition” in a strict, economic sense (i.e. a “highly competitive” 
industry approaches the economic scenario of pure competition). This usage can seem 
counterintuitive since purely competitive producers do not advertise, unilaterally cut prices, or 
engage in other activities that consumers commonly think of as competitive. This is because 
pure competitors do not have differentiated products, and cannot individually affect aggregate 
supply, aggregate demand, or market price. 
20 To compute the concentration ratio for an industry, we use all firms available on Compustat, 
with primary SICs in that industry, irrespective of whether they are single segment or multiple 
segment firms. 
21 The t-statistics for the means of the coefficients (across years) are each computed as the 
mean coefficient divided by the mean standard error for the six annual regressions, all 
multiplied by the square root of the number of years minus one. 
22 The Segment Item Value File is a subset of the Compustat Business Information File, which 
is a companion to the Compustat Annual Files. Form 10-K disclosures are the primary source 
of the segment information in the file (confirmed by telephone call to Compustat). 
23 Although there are twice as many S-M firms as M-M firms, Table 2 indicates that the M-M 
firms are on average more than four times as large as the S-M firms. 
24 The post-SFAS No. 131 mean (of 5.71) is derived from a sub-sample that includes some 
firms previously disclosing seven or more segments. Thus the decrease in segment numbers 
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was substantial for some firms. SFAS No. 131 (Par. 10) requires that an operating segment be 
defined as a component of an enterprise whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the 
enterprise's chief operating decision maker, to make decisions about resources to be allocated to 
the segment and assess its performance. This arguably provides some large firms the 
opportunity to decrease the numbers of their reported segments when adopting SFAS No. 131.  
In a comment letter to the SEC dated June 27, 1996, Engelhard Corp. stated: “We believe the 
guidance may result in an unreasonably high number of operating segments for smaller 
companies; larger companies may have an inherent advantage in that the chief operating 
decision maker may be forced by time constraints to focus on larger segments of operations.” 
25 We attribute this increase in variance to qualitative improvements in segment data reported 
under SFAS No. 131. Ettredge et al. (2005) provide a discussion of these improvements in their 
Appendix.  
26 In our empirical models we employ numbers of reported segments as a control variable. 
27 We also experimented with an alternative measure of reported cross-segment earnings 
variability: range of segment return on assets.  Plotting this variable against total segment assets 
indicated that the variable was not fully controlling for differences in firm size (see Foster 
1986: 98). 
28 Results are basically unchanged when 1997 observations are included. 
29 We truncate all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles before estimating the 
models. 
30 Results are similar when the model is re-estimated using an alternative competitiveness 
measure: the concentration ratio for the firm’s primary four-digit SIC industry. 
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31 We also assess whether the effect of proprietary cost incentives is attenuated by a firm’s need 
for external financing by including an variable coded as the interaction between AbnProf and 
dummy variable coded one if ExternalFin is greater than the sample median.  The 
insignificance of the interaction term (untabled) suggests that the effect of firm-level 
profitability on the dependent variable is independent of the firm’s financing needs.   
32 To determine significance levels for tests of shifts in coefficients, we estimated a pooled 
regression (not tabulated) with a POST-131 dichotomous variable interacted with each term. 
33 Paragraph 18 of SFAS No. 131 requires separate disclosure of operating segments that 
account for 10% or more of total segment revenue, reported profit or loss or combined assets. 
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